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Abstract. Data describing human activities are an important source of knowledge useful for under-
standing individual and collective behavior and for developing a wide range of user services. Unfor-
tunately, this kind of data is sensitive, because people’s whereabouts may allow re-identification of
individuals in a de-identified database. Therefore, Data Providers, before sharing those data, must
apply any sort of anonymization to lower the privacy risks, but they must be aware and capable
of controlling also the data quality, since these two factors are often a trade-off. In this paper we
propose PRUDEnce (Privacy Risk versus Utility in Data sharing Ecosystems), a system enabling a
privacy-aware ecosystem for sharing personal data. It is based on a methodology for assessing both
the empirical (not theoretical) privacy risk associated to users represented in the data, and the data
quality guaranteed only with users not at risk. Our proposal is able to support the Data Provider in
the exploration of a repertoire of possible data transformations with the aim of selecting one specific
transformation that yields an adequate trade-off between data quality and privacy risk. We study the
practical effectiveness of our proposal over three data formats underlying many services, defined on
real mobility data, i.e., presence data, trajectory data and road segment data.
1 Introduction
Large dataset recording human activities, such as records of personal mobility, extracted by
vehicular GPS-enabled devices, records of personal purchases and records describing con-
nections among friends in a social network, are key enablers of a new wave of knowledge-
based services, as well as of new scientific discoveries. The utilization of human data in
commercial services is getting common, but at the same time, raises the concern on leakage
of personal information or re-identification. In fact, numerous services have been tem-
porarily put to halt or even out of service because of such issues 1,2.
The paradigm shift towards human knowledge discovery comes with unprecedented op-
portunities and risks. However, the paradoxical situation we are facing today is that we
are fully running the risks, without fully catching the opportunities of big data: on the one
1Yomiuri - https://goo.gl/Pxiuny
2Tom Tom - https://goo.gl/J8tcuc
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hand, we feel that our private space is vanishing in the digital world, and that our personal
data can be used without feedback and control; on the other hand, the same data are seized
in the databases of companies (telecom companies, insurance companies, ...), which use
legal constraints on privacy as a reason for not sharing it with science and society at large,
keeping this precious source of knowledge locked to data analysts or service developers.
In Europe, policy-makers have responded to this shift with an update to the data protec-
tion legislation, replacing the 1995 Data Protection Directive with a General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR responds to privacy and data protection threats associated
with new data practices by strengthening protections for individuals, but also by harmo-
nizing the legal framework to better enable data to flow within Europe. While both these
changes are welcome, corporate actors, and especially small and medium enterprises, have
struggled to develop the expertise that would enable them to use data to develop inno-
vative products and services, or to generate the expected efficiencies associated with big
data. Therefore, it is necessary to enable knowledge discovery from raw data by setting the
data free, i.e, organizations need to exploit the advantage analyzing available big data while
preventing privacy violations, which may result in negative economic and social impacts.
Although in the last years several techniques for data protection and anonymization have
been proposed (e.g., k-anonymity based techniques, differential privacy based techniques,
etc.), their practical application is inhibited by the results that have a negative impact on
the data utility, due to the loss of information caused by the data transformation.
In our vision, in order to increase the practical impact of the privacy-preserving tech-
niques, and making them effectively applicable on large scale, we need a framework en-
abling a systematic reasoning on the trade-off between privacy protection and data qual-
ity. This kind of reasoning represents the key step for the selection of a specific privacy-
preserving technique suitable for a given dataset. To this end, we propose PRUDEnce, a
system for assessing individual privacy risks and data utility of a specific dataset, which
enables the reasoning on the balancing between data protection and data quality. Privacy
protection is measured in terms of probability that each specific user is re-identified in the
released dataset and data quality is measured in terms of amount of information preserved
considering only users with risk below any specified thresholds. PRUDEnce is designed
for assisting responsible organizations in the sharing of personal data preventing privacy
violations and helping them to consciously choose the proper anonymization method and,
possibly, apply it only on the portion of risky data. The final goal is to enable organizations
in the sharing of only non-risky data. To this end, PRUDEnce provides an approach that,
before applying any privacy-preserving transformation, allows looking at the effective risk
there is in the data, as well as the service or purpose for which the data are queried, instead
of relying only on theoretical results in terms of privacy. Often it is not necessary to apply
the privacy transformation on the whole set of raw data because it is rarely the case that
raw data are needed to develop a service. In practice, every service is fueled by specific pre-
processing of users data, by means of aggregation, selection and filtering, which may alter
significantly the real risk of privacy, compared with the original raw data. For instance, raw
GPS tracks of users’ cars are typically not needed to develop most personal or social mo-
bility services. Real services require aggregations of data by different spatial or temporal
resolutions, may be pertinent to either users’ presence at certain locations or users’ move-
ments across locations, may span over time intervals of different length, may be filtered
according to constraints on the frequency of users’ activities, and so on. Different pre-
processing, that we refer as dataviews, may exhibit very different properties w.r.t. risk. This
requires that the actual privacy risk should be taken into account either before applying
any further privacy-preserving transformation or by the privacy mechanisms themselves.
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If this is not the case, we run the risk of destroying the quality of data without a real need, as
often it happens applying strong privacy transformations as differential privacy [5, 20, 16].
Indeed, as highlighted in [32] differential privacy may seriously and unjustifiably damage
data because of the computation of the global sensitivity that does not consider the actual
data to be protected.
In this complex context, PRUDEnce enables a privacy-aware data sharing ecosystem which
permits a Data Provider (DP) to share data about its users with a Service Developer (SD) after
exploring the risks and quality of all possible dataviews and selecting the one compatible
with its privacy expectation. Our proposed system is general and simply requires the im-
plementation of privacy measures for the risk assessment and of privacy-preserving trans-
formations for the risk mitigation. Given any pair of these two components, our analytical
framework enables the DP in the exploration of privacy risks related to the data, in com-
bination of the corresponding data quality. We highlight that in this paper we focus on
the privacy risk assessment methodology that is the key step for the selection of the most
suitable privacy transformation to be applied on a specific dataset. In this sense, we believe
that PRUDEnce can provide practical support to be compliant with some legal advice and
obligations. Indeed, in the GDPR (and in particular in Article 35) one can find references
to the Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA), which is a process that, taking into ac-
count the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing, enables the assessment of
the impact of the envisaged processing operations on the protection of personal data. Our
privacy risk assessment methodology can help covering a big part of the DPIA, i.e., the
one related to the privacy risk, even it overlooks other aspects, for example, all the steps
related to the analysis of the cost. However, to the best of our knowledge, PIA does not
provides data-driven tools that can effectively measure the privacy risk, but it mainly aims
to create self-awareness. Moreover, in Article 25 of the GDPR there is also an explicit refer-
ence to the data protection by design and by default, and in Recital 26 of the GDPR, it was
stated to take into account any reasonable mean that can be used in re-identifying a natu-
ral person. This is totally compliant with the definition of the reasonable attacks used by
the PRUDEnce framework. Finally, we believe that the output of our elaboration can also
be in line with the principle of transparency advocated by the Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party3 and reported in Recital 39 of the GDPR.
We validate PRUDEnce in the context of location and movement data using a large-scale
mobility dataset pertaining to the vehicular GPS traces of tens of thousands private cars
observed over a month. In particular, we show how to apply in practice the framework an-
alyzing the user privacy risk in typical mobility data formats useful for developing services
such as Point-of-Interest (POI) recommendations, geo-marketing, or positioning of charg-
ing stations for electric vehicles. Note that PRUDEnce is a general framework that allows
the analysis of the privacy risks in any possible context, thus the services and data formats
used in our case studies are only examples used to show the effectiveness of our proposal.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the privacy-aware
ecosystem for data sharing. Section 3 presents the details about our methodology for the
privacy risk assessment. In Section 4 we show how to apply our methodology for the
analysis of three different kinds of mobility data. In Section 5 we discuss a possible dis-
tributed version of our methodology. Section 6 discuss the impact on privacy when mul-
tiple dataviews are released. Lastly, Section 7 discusses the related work and Section 8
concludes the paper.
3Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 17/EN, WP260, Guidelines on transparency under Regulation
2016/679
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2 Privacy-aware ecosystem
Figure 1: Privacy-aware data sharing ecosystem.
We envision an ecosystem for data sharing, enabled by PRUDEnce, our system of privacy
risk assessment, i.e., the measurement of the empirical privacy risk inherent to the data to
be transferred from the Data Provider (DP) to the Service Developer (SD). The architecture
of the ecosystem is illustrated in Figure 1. Here, SD’s aim is to develop services based
on information extracted from the raw personal data stored by the DP, which cannot be
directly shared without a high risk of compromising users’ privacy.4 Note that the SD may
be either another entity with respect to the DP or an untrusted department within the DP
organization.
Therefore, DP needs to examine a repertoire of possible transformations of the raw data
to the purpose of selecting one specific transformation that yields an adequate trade-off
between data quality and privacy risk. The systematic exploration of this search space of
possible transformations is precisely the scope of our proposed privacy risk system. It is
based on a methodology for the measurement of the empirical privacy risk associated to
users in the different possible pre-processing transformations of raw data (e.g., aggrega-
tions, selections and filtering), or dataviews. In the following by privacy risk we intend the
probability that a specific user is re-identified in a specific released dataset, i.e., the prob-
ability that a specific user’s identity is correctly associated to own data, while by empirical
privacy risk we intend the distribution of the risk, i.e., re-identification probability, over
the entire population of users represented in the dataset. Within these assumptions, the
ecosystem operates according to the following workflow:
1. SD specifies the data requirements for a specific service or a set of services that require
the same type and set of data.
4It should be remarked that the proposed privacy-aware ecosystem is a systematic implementation of the
Privacy-by-Design principle [6, 24], and is also compliant with the data minimization principle, i.e., the use of the
minimum information needed for a purpose, as stated in many international regulations, such as EU Directive
95/46/EC and the Regulation EC (No) 45/2001.
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2. DP identifies the dimensions along which raw data can be aggregated, selected and
filtered.
3. DP generates the collection of dataviews with reference to all selected dimensions.
4. DP identifies the possible attacks that a malicious adversary might conduct on a
dataview to re-identify users.
5. For each dataview, DP performs the privacy risk assessment by empirically measur-
ing, on the user population in the data, the distribution of the probability that attacks
succeed. The privacy risk assessment is carried out in tandem with data quality, mea-
sured in terms of coverage, i.e., amount of information preserved considering only
users with risk below any specified thresholds. The complete repertoire of dataviews
with associated risk and quality measurements is referred to as data catalog.
6. DP explores the data catalog to select the dataview and the risk threshold represent-
ing an adequate trade-off between risk and quality, given the data requirements for
the target service and the expected level of tolerated risk.
7. Given the candidate dataview and tolerated risk threshold, DP performs risk mitiga-
tion, i.e., applies a privacy-preserving transformation to eliminate the users with a
risk higher than a certain threshold ensuring that all users in the sanitized dataview
fall below that risk. The advantage of applying such sanitization after the privacy
risk assessment gives the possibility of focusing on the problematic cases, i.e., users
above the tolerated risk, when applying privacy-preserving transformations such as
removal, generalization, randomization, etc.
8. DP reiterates the privacy risk assessment on the sanitized dataview, and delivers it
to the SD with the measurement of the empirical risk and the final coverage of users’
data.
Note that, in the first step SD specifies the properties of the data useful for the service(s).
In case SD has to be develop more services requiring different dataviews characterized for
example by different time constraints or granularity, it has to activate a separated request.
The key analytical tool to reason about privacy risk and data quality, that we introduce in
Section 3.3, is the Risk and Coverage curve, or RAC curve, for privacy risk assessment. The
RAC represents how the coverage of users’ data varies as a function of the tolerated risk,
and it is a concept very similar to the R-U maps (risk-utility maps) [11]. The methodology
is obviously independent on the chosen threshold for tolerated risk, which may vary in
different circumstances, e.g., whether the SD is the general public, an external third party
or an internal department of the DP.
Even if in this paper we consider only the re-identification risk, since it is most known
problem in the literature, PRUDEnce is able to incorporate any other risk measure such
as the risk of inference about sensitive information provided by the attribute value [19] or
other disclosure measures like those defined in [37, 38]. This flexibility is a strong point
of our proposal, in fact it is possible to implement and integrate specific function simply
overriding the risk assessment module.
3 Privacy Risk Assessment
In general, given a database, containing the original whole raw data, i.e., all the detailed
information about the users, it is possible to select the portion of data D, useful for devel-
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oping a specific service. Starting from D, the privacy risk assessment methodology takes
into account two aspects: data dimensions, that determine the level of detail of data (e.g., the
temporal and spatial granularity); and background knowledge dimensions, that determine the
privacy attacks that can be conducted on the data for the user re-identification. For each
combination of data dimensions and background knowledge dimensions values, the goal is to
simulate an attack and empirically quantify the privacy risk, i.e., the risk of re-identification
for each user, and the data quality w.r.t. a privacy risk threshold.
3.1 Data Dimensions
Given the dataset D it is possible to generate different dataviews, by considering different
values for each data dimension. A data dimension is an element of the data on which we
may compute aggregation or filtering of information. Typical dimensions of mobility data
are the spatial and temporal granularity. For each dimension we can have a set of possible
values, and varying them we can generate different dataviews DV = {D1, D2, . . . , Dm},
which are characterized by their own privacy risk. As an example, consider to develop a
parking assistance service that takes as input the set of frequent locations visited by each
user. An important dimension of these data is the spatial granularity to define the parking
areas. In particular, instead of releasing exact locations we can apply a spatial discretization
by a grid and the side size of each cell represents the spatial granularity. For example, we
can use a grid with side size of the cell equal to 500m or 1000m and both are the admissible
values of this dimension. By setting the two values for the spatial dimension we generate
two different dataviews. Probably, in the second one we have that different locations of the
first dataview will be grouped.
3.2 Background Knowledge Dimensions
The background knowledge is the external information that a third party (attacker, service
developer, adversary, potential hacker, etc.) knows about a specific user. When the back-
ground knowledge is combined with the released data, it makes it possible to associate a
record to that user and to enable new inferences. The adversary’s background knowledge
depends on the context and the data and determines the set of possible attacks. An ex-
ample of adversary’s background knowledge could be a set of locations visited by a user.
An adversary might use this information to re-identify that user in the released dataview.
In general it is clear that the probability of success of an attack increases with the number
of observed locations. In other words, a more detailed background knowledge makes the
attack stronger. It is important to clarify that the background knowledge is modeled as
a predicate on data, in order to provide a gain for the attacker. In general, the predicate
must reflect the best effort of the attacker in matching the BK to the entries in the shared
dataview D. The privacy risk assessment methodology for the privacy risk evaluation has
to take into account all possible kinds of background knowledge and for each one it has
to analyze its dimensions. Here, the dimensions represent the elements of the background
knowledge of which it is possible to change the value to model different levels of external
knowledge. More formally, we denote by BK = {BK1, BK2, . . . BKm} a specific kind of
background knowledge, where each BKi represents the set of background knowledge ob-
tained considering a specific configuration i of values of the dimensions. Continuing the
above example, if the user u has the locations l1, l2, l3 we have that the number of observed
locations of u is a background knowledge dimension. Therefore, BK1 represents all possi-
ble cases in which “the third party knows 1 location visited by u”, i.e., BK1 = {l1, l2, l3},
TRANSACTIONS ON DATA PRIVACY 11 (2018)
PRUDEnce: a System for Assessing Privacy Risk vs Utility in Data Sharing Ecosystems145
BK2 represents all possible cases in which “the third party knows 2 locations visited by
u”, i.e., BK2 = {(l1, l2), (l1, l3), (l2, l3)}, and so on. In practice the background knowledge
is generated starting from the data in the dataview. The possible background knowledge
known by an adversary on the user u is a subset of locations associated to u in the dataview
to be shared. As stated in [35] the worst-case scenario considers an adversary knowing the
same data of the shared table. In order to evaluate the trend of the risk changing the quan-
tity of background knowledge possessed by the adversary, we generate for each user all
the possible levels of external knowledge starting from the minimum knowledge (only one
location in the example) to the maximum one (the whole set of user’s locations).
Clearly, the definition of attack models and the corresponding background knowledge is
a key and critical step in our framework because requires some expertise. However, only
defining different levels of possible external knowledge, it is possible to provide organiza-
tions the possibility to reason in a systematic way on the balancing between privacy risks
and data utility, for helping them in making responsible and aware decisions.
3.3 Privacy Risk Measures
Analyzing the privacy risk intuitively means that for each combination of data dimensions
and background knowledge dimensions values it is possible to simulate the attack and empir-
ically quantify the privacy risk, i.e., the risk of re-identification for each user and the data
quality w.r.t. a privacy threshold.
In the following, we denote by D the database containing the original raw data useful for
developing a specific service, and D ∈ DV a dataview extracted from D by considering
specific values for the data dimensions. As an example, D is the database containing all
information about the user movements in Pisa and D contains for each user the list of
locations visited in a specific month and is obtained by using a spatial discretization by a
grid with side size of the cells equal to 500m. The set of users represented in the raw data
D is called U .
For each user, the risk of re-identification can be computed, by measuring the probability
of his re-identification in a released data.
Definition 1 (Probability of re-identification given D). The probability of re-identification
PRD(d = u|t) denotes the probability to correctly associate a record d ∈ D to a unique identity u,
given t ∈ BKi and that D has been published.
Let Du be the set of records that represent the data of the user u in D. The probability
of re-identification depends on: (a) the number of records related to the user u in D, com-
patible with the background knowledge t, i.e., suppDu(t) and, (b) the number of records
in D compatible with the background knowledge t, i.e., suppD(t). Here, the compatibility
is expressed by a function that defines if a record of the database matches the background
knowledge t. Therefore, we have: PRD(d = u|t) = suppDu (t)suppD(t) . Note that, if the user u is not
represented in D we have PRD(d = u|t) = 0.
Now, we define the risk of re-identification, as the worst harmful situation for the user.
Definition 2 (Risk of re-identification). Given a user u his risk of re-identification is his maxi-
mum probability of re-identification given the set of BKi, i.e., Risk(u,D) = maxPRD(d = u|t)
for t ∈ BKi.
This risk has the lower bound |Du||D| measuring the random choice in D. We highlight that
if a user u /∈ D we have Risk(u,D) = 0.
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Clearly, the above definitions are related to an exact (even if partial) background knowl-
edge of an adversary; thus, both probability and risk of re-identification are based on a
perfect matching. If a partial matching is considered in the re-identification process, then
some alternative approach should be used. In the literature, there are two major approaches
to solve the problem of partial matching: probabilistic record linkage [18, 39] and distance
based record linkage [1, 35].
For each dataview D ∈ DV and for each background knowledge t ∈ BKi the risk of re-
identification can be computed and used to describe how the risk is distributed over the
user population; to this aim we introduce the following curve.
Definition 3 (Risk and Coverage curve w.r.t. users). The RACU curve is the function that for
each risk value r, quantifies the percentage of users in the dataset D having at most that risk. It is
defined as:
RACU (r,D) =
|{u ∈ U |Risk(u,D) ≤ r}|
|U | .
In order to compare distinct RACU curves of different dataviews in DV , we define the
following index representing the whole curve with a single number:
i−RACU (r,D) =
∫ 1
0
RACU (r,D).
Figure 2: An example of RAC and the relative i−RAC index.
Figure 2 shows the geometrical representation of a RACU and its index.
In general, a user has associated many data in D, therefore an important aspect to be
measured is the percentage of data covered by users in D having at most a specific privacy
risk. This gives a hint about the data coverage w.r.t. a selected risk and, as above, we can
compute a curve representing how the data coverage changes w.r.t. the distribution of risk.
Note that RACU is not able to capture this aspect because it may happen that the same
user is associated to more than one record in the same dataview. Therefore, we define
the RACD curve as the function that for each risk value r, quantifies the percentage of
records in D that are covered by users having at most the risk r. In other words, given
Ur = {u ∈ U |Risk(u,D) ≤ r} and let DUr be the set of data covered by users in Ur we
define
RACD(r,D) =
|DUr |
|D| .
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This formulation has a limit: it permits the computation of data coverage only in terms of
records associated to users. Sometimes, given a kind of data it is necessary to measure the
quantity of data in a different way. For example, given a dataset of trajectories one might
measure the quantity of data in terms of number of trajectories, number of locations, or
space covered by the trajectories. Or, also, in case of spatial clusters of trajectories we can
measure the number of clusters involved, their traffic flows or the space covered by them.
To solve this problem we assume to have a function c(U ′, D) that takes a dataset D and a
set of users U ′ and returns a quantification of the data within D covered by only users in
U ′. Therefore, we define the Risk and Coverage curve w.r.t. data as follows.
Definition 4 (Risk and Coverage curve w.r.t. data). The RACD curve is the function that for
each risk value r, quantifies the percentage of data in D that are covered by users having at most the
risk r. Given Ur = {u ∈ U |Risk(u,D) ≤ r} is defined as:
RACD(r,D) =
c(Ur, D)
c(U,D)
.
Note that RACD does not takes into consideration any data representing users in U\Ur .
Also in this case it is useful to represent in a concise way the RACD with a single number,
thus we define
i−RACD(r,D) =
∫ 1
0
RACD(r,D).
The RACU and RACD curves represent a summarization of the privacy risks and data
quality associated to the dataview D and the users represented within it.
Essentially, the Risk and Coverage curves are representations very similar to the risk-
information loss maps and to the Risk-Utility maps [11], and they correlate with Statistical
Disclosure Control [10]. However, our RAC curves are not limited to information loss, but
they can express different measures of data utility. Moreover, they offer a more detailed
representation of the behavior (w.r.t. the trade-off between privacy risk and data utility)
of each situation (i.e., different dataviews or different attacks). In this way the framework
for each situation enables the identification of non-risky users and non-risky data, that the
organization might share, and the risky users (data) where it is necessary to apply privacy
transformations before the sharing. On the contrary, Risk-Utility maps represent only the
global situation varying the situations, offering a vision which can be shown also by our
Data Catalog (see Section 3.4).
Note that considering several steps of sanitization over a dataview, the RACD must be
computed considering what we want to publish without considering the privacy process,
i.e., the initial dataview. Formally, RACD(r,D) =
c(Ur,D
′)
c(U,D) where D
′ is the resulting dataset
at the n-th cycle of sanitization and D is the data dataview without any transformation.
3.4 Data Catalog
The methodology of privacy risk analysis generates a Data Catalog, where one can find
information regarding data useful for the development of a service or set of services. In
particular, given the:
• Data Format, i.e., the data needed to realize the service(s)
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• Privacy Assessment Setting, i.e., the set of dataviews and the background knowledge
dimensions.
The Data Catalog provides:
• Quantification of Privacy Risk, i.e., the evaluation of the empirical risk of re-identification
(i−RACU )
• Quantification of Data Quality, i.e., the quality level we can achieve with private data,
compared with the data quality of original data (i−RACD).
Figure 3: Data Catalog: i−RACU
The set of i − RACs indexes allows representing the whole catalog as an n-dimensional
plane where n is the number of (data and background) dimensions defined. In Figure 3 a
representation of a 3-dimensional plane is illustrated where the red area represents a high
value of i − RACU , i.e. the set of datasets where the risk of privacy for the users is lower.
The data catalog represents a summary of the results of the measurements applied to the
dataset by changing the different dimensions. It becomes an important tool that the DP and
the SD may use to identify the most suitable dataview that can be released for developing
a specific service. The catalog provides a complete view of the pros and cons related to the
release of each dataview thus, since the beginning of the service development, the DP and
the SD have the possibility to make a decision considering the privacy issues. Specifically,
the DP is perfectly aware about the level of risk of users in the dataview and the SD has a
quantative information describing the quality of data which is receiving.
4 Privacy Risk Assessment in Mobility
In this section we show three practical examples of the application of our methodology in
mobility data. This is important to show that PRUDEnce is not only a theoretical tool, but
it is actually applicable in real contexts. The analysis of movements is made possible by
the wide range of wireless technologies able to record the position of the people, such as
the satellite-enabled Global Positioning System (GPS) and the mobile phone networks. In
the following we present a small overview on the common terminology used in mobility
context:
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Definition 5. A point pi = (xi, yi, ti) is an entity represented in a three dimensional space where
xi, yi are the spatial coordinates and ti is the temporal one.
Definition 6. A trajectory t is a temporal ordered list of spatio-temporal points p1 . . . pn in which
the user position has been observed by the device.
Having additional information like a road network it is possible to map the points to road
segments obtaining a richer representation of a trajectory as a sequence of roads traversed
by the user. Other common processing of the observed points includes the discretization of
the space or time using grids or time-windows. More formally, we define a grid as follows.
Definition 7. Given a geographical area A = rect(Ax, Ay,Aw,Ah), the grid GAm is the set
{c(0,0) . . . c(n,k)} where the squared cell c(i,j) = rect(Ax+m× i, Ay+m× j,m,m), n = pAwm q,
k = pAhm q and m is the length of the side of the cell.
Here, rect(x, y, w, h) represents a rectangle with the top left vertex in the coordinates (x, y),
width w and height h. The resulting set of cells covers the entire geographical area with
same dimension rectangles. A point is generalized with the cell which contains it. Similarly
for the time-windows the period under analysis can be divided into time-slots of a specific
duration (e.g. a day divided in 24 slots of 1 hour).
In this paper, to show the practical relevance of PRUDEnce, we simulated the ecosystem
using a large-scale mobility dataset containing real users GPS traces. This dataset is pro-
vided by an Italian company called OctoTelematics collecting data for insurance purposes.
This dataset is composed of GPS observations of 38,259 private cars active in Tuscany, Italy
in a period of 30 days between June and July 2011 for a total of 1,382,892 trajectories. We
used the dataset to study the privacy risk assessment for three different kinds of mobil-
ity data formats used for developing mobility services such as parking assistance, geo-
marketing, and route prediction. Clearly, the data formats, extracted from our mobility
dataset and analyzed in the following, are not exhaustive, but they are only three simple
examples that allows us to validate our framework and show how different levels of ag-
gregation and granularity in the data may affect the privacy risk. Moreover, they allow us
to simulate the typical situation where the DP owns a set of data (in our examples mobility
data) and receives many different requests of data from SDs that have to build different
services typically unrelated among them.
4.1 Privacy Risk Assessment for Presence Data
The availability of users’ presence data in specific locations enables several mobility ser-
vices such as parking assistance, recommendation, alert/notification and context-aware
advertising [31].
In these cases given a specific time window and a geographical area, developing the ser-
vice requires to know for each user his list of most frequent locations:
ui : 〈l1, f1〉, . . . , 〈ln, fn〉where in each pair 〈lj , fj〉:
• lj is the location visited by the user; it is often represented by a cell that is a generaliza-
tion of the location coordinates. This information may be sensitive because identifies
the frequent user visited places, that might permit the user re-identification.
• fj is the number of times user ui visited the location lj in that specific time window.
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Figure 4: Example of scenario with 5 users and 8 locations
In order to generate the different dataviews starting from the location data, related to a
specific time window and a geographical area, we need to define: a strategy for the spa-
tial discretization, to get cells instead of exact locations, and the frequency threshold f for
filtering possible infrequent locations. In the following, we discretize the space by a grid
where the cells become the locations to be released. Therefore, in this setting we have two
data dimensions: the side size of each cell that determines the granularity of the spatial infor-
mation released about each user and the frequency threshold that defines a filter on the data
to be distributed. Concerning the side size of the cell we considered the following values:
250m, 500m and 750m; while for the frequency threshold we set f = 1, 4, 7, 10, 13. Note
that, given a frequency threshold f , the dataview contains only the information on loca-
tions which are frequent at least f times. After setting the values for the data dimensions
we extracted from the database 3 ∗ 5 = 15 dataviews.
Example 8. Consider the case in Figure 4 where there are 8 cells and 5 users (blue, purple, green,
orange and pink). If we set the frequency threshold to 3 the dataview will be:
blue(circles) : 〈B2, 5〉, 〈D2, 4〉, 〈C1, 3〉
pink(crosses) : 〈C2, 3〉
purple(squares) : 〈B2, 4〉, 〈D2, 3〉
green(triangles) : 〈D1, 4〉, 〈D2, 3〉
orange(stars) : 〈C2, 3〉
4.1.1 Background Knowledge based attack
We assume the adversary knows a set of places visited by a specific user with a minimum
number of visits in each location: Lh : 〈l1,mf1〉, . . . , 〈lh,mfh〉. For example, if the attacker
knows that during a working week (five days) the user u never missed his work (location
l2), then he also knows that mf2 = 5.
Note that, the adversary also knows the minimum frequency f used to generate the dataview.
Given the background knowledge Lh, to perform the attack for the user re-identification,
he can use only the knowledge about the locations lj with mfj ≥ f ; we call it Ls ⊆ Lh.
Given the dataview, the set of candidates matching the background knowledge Ls is de-
fined as R = {u′ ∈ U |∀〈li,mfi〉 ∈ Ls∃〈lj , fj〉 ∈ u′. li = lj ∧ fj ≥ mfi}. The probability of re-
identification of the user u is PRD(d = u|Ls) = suppDu (Ls)suppD(Ls) = 1|R| . Note that suppDu(Ls) = 1
since in the dataview we have a transaction for each user.
In the case of Ls = ∅, i.e., each location in Lh has frequency less than f , the set of candi-
dates R is equal to the whole set of users U .
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Figure 5: Data Catalog: i−RACU and i−RACD for each combination of locations frequency
and grid size and setting the level of background knowledge to h = 2.
In this context, the dimensions of the background knowledge are: (a) the number of loca-
tions known by the adversary h and (b) the minimum number of visits per location. In the
following, we simulate the attack with number of known locations h = 1, 2, 3 and with a
minimum number of known visits per location equal to the exact number of real visits (i.e,
100%), the 50% of the real visits, and considering only the information about the presence
of the user in the location, i.e., for each location count(lj) = 1. In the following, we present
an example to clarify this attack.
Example 9. Consider the example in Figure 4, suppose that the attacker wants to discover which
are the transactions related to Mr. Smith, who he saw parking 2 times in the bar located in the D2
area. The attacker search for users who have the location D2 and frequency greater or equal to 2.
The matched users are purple (squares) and green (triangles) having frequency 3 and blue (circles)
who has frequency equal to 4. So, in this case, the probability of re-identification is 13 .
The setting for the background knowledge dimensions concludes the definition of the Pri-
vacy Assessment Setting and generates 9 different attacks to be simulated on the 15 dataviews
get by setting of data dimensions. Note that, the background knowledge described above
is only one of the possible that we can define for the privacy assessment.
4.1.2 Privacy Risk Analysis
For the simulation of the 9 attacks described above, starting from the GPS data, introduced
in Section 4, we selected the users with at least a trajectory ending inside Pisa urban area.
Moreover, in order to remove the “inactive” users, we filter out the users having less then
7 trajectories in one month. This pre-processing step is needed in order to have a realis-
tic simulation of the users in an urban context (for this application). The result is a set of
247, 633 trajectories related to 3, 780 users. Supposing to create a dataset useful for devel-
oping a parking assistance service where locations are parking areas, for each trajectory, we
took only its last point that represents a parking position. In this way we constructed the
dataset D, that will be used for extracting the dataviews to be analyzed.
In this case, the function c(U ′, D) measures the number of visited locations related to users
U’, so RACD shows the ratio between the number of locations related to safe users and the
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total number of visited locations. For each dataview and for each background knowledge
dimension setting, the privacy assessment module computes both indexes i − RACU and
i−RACD, for the data catalog.
Both planes depicted in Figure 5 increase moving from the smallest grid to the largest
one and from the lowest frequency threshold to the highest. This shape is typical for those
cases where the data dimensions have a monotonic effect on the indexes. It is interesting
to note how the two dimensions interact with each other in the slope of the plane: using
a small grid leads to a slight increment especially for the i − RACD. This happens due
the fact that, with a small grid, the frequency values in the locations are lower, boosting
the effectiveness of the frequency threshold. In particular, analyzing the i−RACD we can
observe how having a frequency threshold equal to 13 or 10 is practically the same because
we have the biggest impact on the data with frequency 7. On the other hand, with a larger
grid this effect is less evident. Selecting points over the planes it is possible to analyze the
distributions of the risk.
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Figure 6: RACU and RACD varying the frequency and fixing background knowledge to
h = 2 and grid size to 500m
Setting the background knowledge to h = 2 and the grid size to 500m, we obtain the dis-
tributions shown in Figure 6. They represent the RACU and RACD varying the frequency
threshold value. We observe that the slopes of RACU are less steep than the slopes of
RACD; this means that the risky users have more data than the others, especially when the
frequency threshold is lower. Similarly in Figure 7, varying the grid size, we can see how
a larger grid reduces the risk of re-identification due the fact that there are less locations in
the area, and, therefore, the users are hidden in the crowd.
In Figure 8 we show the RACU and RACD curves that, for h = 2 and for h = 3, are
very similar because the average number of locations per user is low, i.e., most of the users
have only two locations which probably are the home and the workplace. The results for h
values higher than 3 do not show relevant changes; for sake of readability we did not report
them. Focussing on the differences between h = 1 and h = 2, it is clear that knowing two
locations makes a big difference in both RACU and RACD; therefore this is a crucial point
in the decision of releasing the data.
Figure 9 shows the impact of changing, in the background knowledge, the information
about the minimum number of user’s visits known per location. While in the previous
experiments this parameter was set to 50% of the original one (average case), here we show
what happens in the following two cases: (worst case) the attacker knows the exact number
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Figure 7: RACU and RACD varying the grid and fixing background knowledge to h = 2
and frequency to f = 7
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Figure 8: RACU and RACD varying the background knowledge h = 1, 2, 3 and fixing
frequency to f = 7 and grid size to 500m.
of visits, and (best case) he does not have any information about the user’s visits. The plot
clearly highlights that the absence of information about the number of visits per location
leads to no risk for users because the frequency constraint makes useless the knowledge
information owned by the attacker.
In conclusion, we can make a decision about which is the best dataview considering: (i)
we understood that taking a value of h higher than 2 does not change greatly the results, so
we can select h = Maxu∈U (|u|); (ii) The value 7 represents a critical frequency threshold,
i.e. with a higher value the risk distribution and quality slightly increase, while for lower
values they have an important decrease; (iii) a large grid leads to a better risk distribution
and a better data quality. Obviously, the last two considerations affect the kind of service
which can be built on top of this data. For example, if we consider the parking assistance
service, a large grid leads to a larger spatial granularity of each location, and the value
of the frequency threshold set the minimum number of user’s parkings for enabling the
service in a specific location.
TRANSACTIONS ON DATA PRIVACY 11 (2018)
154
Francesca Pratesi, Anna Monreale, Roberto Trasarti, Fosca Giannotti, Dino Pedreschi,
Tadashi Yanagihara
Figure 9: RACU for different values of minimum number of visits known per location and
fixing h = 2, grid size to 500m and frequency to f = 7.
4.2 Privacy Risk Assessment for Trajectory Data
The distribution of trajectory data describing the movements of users are an important
source of information useful for developing services, based on a mechanism of route pre-
diction, such as navigational services, car pooling service and location recommendation
services. This kind of data can be used also for supporting the traffic management thanks
to different mobility analyses that enable the understanding of urban mobility: identifica-
tion of access points in a urban area, the mobility atlas of a city, the identification of urban
areas with high traffic volume.
For developing this kind of services, given a specific time window and a geographical
area, it is necessary to obtain a set of user trajectories i.e., a dataset that for each user con-
tains a sequence of temporally annotated road segments:
ui : 〈s1, to1 , td1〉, . . . 〈sn, ton , tdn〉.
Here, each element of the sequence is composed of:
• si that represents a road segment driven by the user starting from the origin location
oi and ending in the destination location di;
• toi and tdi represent the time associated to origin and destination locations respec-
tively.
In order to generate the different dataviews starting from the trajectory data, we need to
define the time granularity, i.e., the precision of the times toi and tdi associated to each link.
This represents the only data dimension.
We approximated the time to 30 minutes, 60 minutes and 300 minutes obtaining 3 dataviews.
4.2.1 Background Knowledge based attack
The attack model that we consider in this case is the typical sequence linking attack on move-
ment data [23]. Before explaining the details of the attack we introduce the notion of sub-
trajectory.
Definition 10. Let tr = 〈s1, to1 , td1〉, . . . 〈sn, ton , tdn〉 be a user trajectory. We say that tr′ =
〈s′1, t′o1 , t′d1〉, . . . 〈s′m, t′om , t′dm〉 is a sub-trajectory of tr (tr′  tr) if there exist integers i ≤ i1 <
. . . < im ≤ n such that ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m 〈s′j , t′oj , t′dj 〉 = 〈sij , toij , tdij 〉.
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We assume an attacker knows a sub-trajectory tr′ = 〈s′1, t′o1 , t′d1〉, . . . 〈s′m, t′om , t′dm〉 of the
trajectory of some specific person u ∈ U . He can gain this information for example, by
shadowing that person for some time, and could use it to re-identify that person in the
released dataview and retrieve the complete trajectory.
The ability to link the published data to external information, which enables various re-
spondents associated with the data to be re-identified is known as linking attack model.
In relational data, linking is made possible by using a combination of attributes that can
uniquely identify individuals, such as birth date and gender; these attributes are called
quasi-identifiers. The remaining attributes, called sensitive, represent the private infor-
mation, which may be disclosed by the linking attack, and thus has to be protected. In
privacy-preserving data publishing techniques, such as k-anonymity, the goal is to pro-
tect personal sensitive data against this kind of attack by suppression or generalization
of quasi-identifier attributes. The movement data have a sequential nature; in the case of
sequential data the dichotomy of attributes into quasi-identifiers (QI) and private informa-
tion (PI) does not hold any longer. Thus, in the case of spatio-temporal data a sub-trajectory
can play both the role of QI and PI. In a linking attack conducted by a sub-trajectory known
by the attacker the entire trajectory is the PI that is disclosed after the re-identification of
the respondent, while the sub-trajectory serves as QI. So, in this case study we consider
the following attack: the attacker, by using the above background knowledge, constructs
the set of candidate trajectories in the released dataset containing the sub-trajectory tr′ and
tries to identify the whole trajectory relative to u, i.e., R = {trui ∈ D|tr′  trui}. In the
following we say that |R| is the support of the trajectory tr′, i.e., suppD(tr′). The probability
of re-identifying the user u by tr′ is PR(d = u|tr′) = suppDu (tr′)suppD(tr′) . Note that suppDu(tr′) = 1,
since in the released dataset we have an entry for each user.
In this context the only dimension of the background knowledge is the number of crossed
segments known by the adversary h. We simulated the attack by setting the number of
known segments equal to h = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, n, where n is the total number of segments in the
whole user trajectory.
The setting for the background knowledge dimensions concludes the definition of the
Privacy Assessment Setting and generates 6 different attacks to be simulated on each one of
3 dataviews determined by setting the data dimension.
4.2.2 Privacy Risk Analysis
For the simulation of the 6 attacks described above, we extracted from the GPS data intro-
duced in Section 4 the trajectories of one day between 8:00AM to 01:00PM in Pisa. Those
trajectories are processed by a map matching procedure generating, for each user, a single
sequence of road segments. This dataset will be used for extracting the dataviews to be
analyzed.
In this case c(U ′, r) quantifies the number of trajectories’ segments related to users having
risk at most r, so RACD indicates the ratio between the number of segments related to safe
users and the total number of road segments. For each dataview and for each background
knowledge dimension setting, the privacy assessment module computes both indexes i −
RACU and i − RACD generating the planes depicted in Figure 10, which will be part of
the data catalog. In this case we can see how the time granularity is not very effective: in
all the dataviews the two indexes are very low, exception made for the combination time
300 minutes and h = 1. To better understand what happens at the border of the peak, we
can study the RACs with h = 3. In Figure 11 we show the curves corresponding to those
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points in the planes, and we observe that a slight change of the curves appears in the case
of time approximated to 300 minutes.
Figure 10: Data Catalog: i−RACU and i−RACD for each combination of time granularity
and level of background knowledge.
The other border of the peak contains all the points of the plane with time 60 minutes;
the relative RACs are shown in Figure 12. Here, the height of the curves is lower than the
previous case, but we have a change when the background knowledge is h = 1.
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Figure 11: RACU and RACD for h = 3 by varying the time granularity
The analysis of the planes and the curves leads to the conclusion that this kind of data
is potentially very dangerous for the users’ privacy and some deep mitigation of this risk
must be applied before the releasing. In literature several anonimyzation techniques for
trajectory data and sequential data exist, such as [23], [34], and [2].
4.3 Privacy Risk Assessment for Road Segment Data
The knowledge about crowded road segments enables several services, ranging from the
identification of strategic locations for setting up new facilities (e.g., franchise stores, gaso-
line/fuel stations) to navigational services optimizing the routing system to avoid conges-
tions.
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Figure 12: RACU and RACD varying the background knowledge h =
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, n(max length) and setting the time to 60min
For developing this kind of services it is necessary to get areas with high volume of traffic
in a specific slot of the day. This can get by specific analytical processes applied on user
movements related to a given period and geographical area.
Each area is represented by:
ci : tw, {s1, s2, . . . , sp}, µ
where {s1, s2, . . . , sp} is a set of road segments characterized by a volume of traffic de-
scribed by the index µ in the time-window tw.
The analytical process to extract the above areas from user movements is composed by
three steps: i) using a frequency threshold f , we select only segments with a high volume
of traffic, i.e., segments crossed by a high number of user in the specific time-window tw;
ii) a density based clustering [3] is applied using a spatial tolerance ; iii) for each cluster of
segments, representing an area, the traffic index µ is computed as average of the segments
frequency.
In order to generate different dataviews we exploit three data dimensions: the temporal
dimension, that defines the temporal granularity of the time-window, the frequency thresh-
old, that defines a filter on the segments to be distributed, and the spatial tolerance of the
clustering, that affects the clusters composition. Concerning the first dimension, in our
experiment we set tw = 1 hour and  = 50m, 100m, 150m, 200m, while for the frequency
threshold we set f = 200, 250, 300, 350. The number of the resulting dataviews is 16.
In the following we present a simple example that highlights the main steps to get the
clusters of links to be distributed.
Example 11. Suppose to apply the analytical process described above on a dataset of trajectories.
The first step is to split the trajectories in two time slots: 09-10 AM and 10-11 AM getting the
following trajectories depicted in Figure 13 (top):
09:00AM-10:00AM 10:00AM-11:00AM
u1 : A,B,E u5 : B,F, P,Q, V
u2 : A,B,C,D u6 : F,G
u3 :M,N,O,H u7 : P, S
u4 : H, I, L,M u8 : P, S, T
u9 : P, S,R, V
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Figure 13: Left: trajectories and clusters in the time slot 09:00AM-10:00AM; Right: trajecto-
ries and clusters in the time slot 10:00AM-11:00AM.
Note that above we are indicating each road segment of a trajectory by a letter. If we set the mini-
mum frequency to 2, we get the clusters in Figure 13 (bottom) for each time window. In particular,
in the time-window we obtain the clusters:
green, 09 : 00AM − 10 : 00AM, {M,H}, 2
red, 09 : 00AM − 10 : 00AM, {A,B}, 2
orange, 10 : 00AM − 11 : 00AM, {F}, 2
blue, 10 : 00AM − 11 : 00AM, {P, S, V }, 3
4.3.1 Background Knowledge based attack
In this case, the dataview does not contain data directly linkable to a single user but models
representing information on groups of road segments visited by several users. Here, each
user movement may contribute to several clusters.
The attacker, if he is capable to identify the set of models representing the user movements,
may understand his target’s habits and infer sensitive information about him.
We highlight that the adversary, knowing only a portion of the user road segments, can-
not identify all clusters crossed by that user because he could have crossed an unmatched
cluster with the portion of trajectory that the attacker does not know. On the other hand,
knowing all user road segments the attacker has already the complete knowledge about
the user mobility and cannot gain any new information.
Another external knowledge that an adversary may use in his attack is the period of time
in which the user moved. This can help him to reduce the number of candidate clusters.
Therefore, we assume that given a user u the attacker knows the time-slots of all his move-
ments BK = t1, t2, . . . , tm.
Let ClBK be the set of released clusters covering temporally the time-slots in BK and let
ClBK,u be the subset of these clusters crossed by the user u. We define a function W (.)
that takes a set of clusters with their average frequency and computes the total frequency
W (ClBK) =
∑
ci∈ClBK µci .
Therefore, for each user u, we compute the probability of re-identification as the probabil-
ity to associate a cluster to the user u PR(d = u|BK) = W (ClBK,u)W (ClBK) .
In this setting the Privacy Assessment simulates the described attack on the 16 dataviews.
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Example 12. Continue with Example 11. Assuming that the attacker knows that Mr.Smith (u5) is
represented in the released data and that he travelled only in the time slot 10:00AM-11:00AM. The
risk of re-identifying the cluster crossed by u5 is equal to 1 because with his trajectory he crossed both
the blue and orange cluster. Instead, if we consider the user u1, assuming that the attacker knows
that he traveled only in the time slot 09:00AM-10:00AM, then the risk is equal to µredµred+µgreen =
1
2 .
4.3.2 Privacy Risk Analysis
In this case study we used the whole dataset described in Section 4 to simulate the pri-
vacy risk assessment methodology. The first step is the application of an analytical process
based on the computation of a set of clusters of frequent road segments. Figure 14 shows
the clusters distribution in different hours of the day by varying the minimum frequency
threshold required for the road segments (left) and the spatial tolerance of the clustering 
(right).
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Figure 14: Left: clusters distribution during the day by varying the minimum frequency
threshold for the road segments; Right: clusters distribution during the day by varying the
spatial tolerance of the clustering  .
We can observe how both distributions have the typical two peaks shape well-known in
the traffic management field, i.e. the morning rush hour and the evening one.
In this case, the function c(U ′, r) evaluates the coverage of extracted clusters, i.e., the num-
ber of segments that are inside the cluster; here, RACD indicates the ratio between the cov-
erage of cluster computed after the remotion of unsafe users and the coverage of cluster
computed on the whole dataset. It is worth noting that in this case removing single users
might not directly affect the results of this function, since each segment might remain fre-
quent even if some users are no longer present. Starting from the dataset generated by
this analytical process, the risk assessment module computes both indexes i − RACU and
i − RACD for each combination of spatial tolerance  and minimum frequency threshold.
The two resulting planes are depicted in Figure 15. The i−RACU shows almost a constant
increase going from the configuration ( = 200, f = 350) to ( = 50, f = 200) suggesting an
inverse proportionality to the two data dimensions. More interesting is the i−RACD pre-
senting an area with high values surrounded by valleys. This means that a slight change of
data dimensions values may lead to a reduction of the data quality.
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Figure 15: Data Catalog: i−RACU and i−RACD for a dataset created with time-window
1 hour.
Figure 16 shows the RACU and RACD curves by setting the minimum frequency thresh-
old for the road segments to f = 300 and varying the spatial threshold used by the cluster-
ing algorithm. In this case the aggregation of the data leads to very low risk for the users
(notice that the i−RACU varies between 0.89 to 0.97). The shape of RACD is very different
from other cases. This is due the fact we are managing patterns and not single user data.
Looking at the curves we note how, for all  values, a vertical increase occurs around 45%
of risk generating a jump in RACD value from 15% to 90%; i.e. if we require a privacy
guarantee with a risk lower than 45%, the data quality drops.
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Figure 16: RACU and RACD by varying the spatial tolerance  and setting the frequency to
f = 300
Moreover, considering the points on the plane having  = 150m, we have the RACs de-
picted in Figure 17 showing how the frequency changes the risk distribution. For theRACU
we observe that different values of frequency produce small changes in the curves. On the
contrary, theRACD shows that using a lower frequency threshold we can move the vertical
increase to lower value of risk. This guarantees more privacy without destroying the data.
In conclusion, looking at the data catalog we understood that data dimensions do not
impact the number of risky users, therefore the attention should be focused on the data
quality. The data dimension  has a limited effect on i−RACD, which is really sensitive to
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Figure 17: RACU and RACD by varying frequency of each road segment and setting the
spatial tolerance to  = 100m.
the frequency threshold.
5 Towards Distributed Computation
In addition to utilization and privacy risk, computational aspects is also a crucial part of
the assessment procedure; it would be difficult to justify its usefulness for actual usage if it
took days or weeks to complete the computation. The key issue here is how to distribute the
computation of the RAC curves as the number of users in the dataview scales up. This task
boils down to the distributed computation of histograms based on the computation of the
privacy risk for each user. A possible natural implementation of this task using the Map-
Reduce paradigm, where each node compute in parallel the risk of a set of users. Given the
dataviewD and its partitioning {P1 . . . Pn}, each map node is assigned to a partition Pj and
the map step enumerates all the possible adversary background knowledge {bki1 . . . bkim}
relative to each user ui, counts the occurrences of each bk while maintaining the set of users
sharing the same bk. Then, by using bk as key for the shuffling step, the system groups all
users having in common the vulnerability against bk. The reduce step finally computes
the maximum probability of re-identification of each user given the shared background
knowledge and uses such information for constructing the RAC curves. Considering the
cost of centralized version as O(n), where n is the number of user, we can say that the
theoretical lower bound of the distributed version is O(n/k), where k is the number of
nodes used to execute the process in parallel. Clearly, other computational costs such as
overhead in the distribution of work and network communications may reduce the gain in
a real application. In Figure 18 we show the runtime analysis of the distributed version and
compare the results with the theoretical lower bound. We tested our implementation for the
case study presented in Section 4.1. However, similar optimizations can be achieved also
for the data formats used in the other two case studies. Results show that the execution
time is very close to the theoretical lower bound highlighting that the overheads have a
small effect on the runtime. We ran this test increasing the number of nodes (i.e. from 1,
which is the centralized version, to 7) and we can see that the process scale up smoothly.
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6 Releasing multiple Dataviews
In this section we discuss the impact on privacy protection when multiple dataviews are
released by the DP. The problem of managing the risk in this particular context is already
studied in the literature related to the compositional attack [30, 4], to the incremental publi-
cation of datasets from an organization [40] and to multiple views analysis [41]. To the best
of our knowledge, all the existing works are based on the presence of sensitive attribute,
and, at least in the case of compositional attack, on the possibility of discover sensitive in-
formation exploiting the uniqueness of quasi-identifiers (QI) and private information (PI)
in different datasets. Here, the problem is to check if the combination of datasets, that sin-
gularly are safe from a privacy perspective, leads to some possible inferences or privacy
threats. In brief, they are based on the unicity of a PI among the possible values given by
the QI in two or more datasets. As already said, in case of mobility data we do not have
the distinction between QI and PI, therefore given a released dataview, with the attacks
defined in Section 4, we already tested the linkability and the protection level for all the
possible combinations of locations. In other words, given a dataview, if the risk assessment
provides an evaluation that guarantees a level x of privacy, we ensure that this protection
is guaranteed also for the potential PI.
However, our framework is able to manage a more general situation without doing as-
sumption on the type of data. The universal solution is based on keeping track of the
previously released dataviews, in order to perform the risk assessment (and the mitiga-
tion process) incrementally. In practice, if the DP released a certain dataview (D1) to a
certain SD and, then, DP receives a new query from the same SD, instead of assess the pri-
vacy risk only on the plain dataview (D2), DP tests the combination of the two dataviews
(D1 +D2). The key point here is the correct definition of the background knowledge and,
consequently, the cautious definition of attacks. This solution has the price of keeping track
of data released to each SD, a solution considered reasonable in literature [40, 41], eventu-
ally considering also datasets released by other data holders [4].
Considering different kind of data, where there is a distinction between QI and PI, it
would be interesting to extend PRUDEnce analyzing the assessment of privacy risk when
datasets are independently released by different DPs, i.e., each DP does not have any infor-
mation about the other anonymized releases, like in the work [14].
7 Related Work
One of the most related work is the LINDDUN methodology [9], where the authors intro-
duce a privacy-aware threat analysis framework based on Microsoft’s STRIDE methodol-
ogy [33] capable to model privacy threats in software-based systems. LINDDUN method-
ology lacks a quantitative approach for privacy evaluation, as that one presented in this
paper. Therefore from this perspective both approaches can be considered complementary.
In the literature, different techniques for risk management has been proposed in the last
years such as the OWASP’s Risk Rating Methodology5, Microsoft’s DREAD [22], NIST’s
Special Publication 800-306, and SEI’s OCTAVE7. Many of them does not consider in deep
privacy including it only when assessing the impact of a threat.
5https://goo.gl/Df98k1
6https://goo.gl/3142Mb
7http://www.cert.org/octave/
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A proposal that quantitatively tries to manage privacy risks was presented by Trabelsi et
al. [36], where an entropy-based method is elaborated to evaluate the disclosure risk of per-
sonal data. Other works in the literature study the re-identification risk as privacy measure.
Hay et al. [17] propose three models of external information used by an adversary to attack
naively-anonymized networks. They take into consideration attacks based on the struc-
tural knowledge of network data. In the context of online social networks Liu and Terzi
[21] propose a framework for computing privacy scores for each user in the network. Such
scores indicate the potential risk caused by her participation in the network. Dankar and
Emam [8] introduce a re-identification risk metric that measures the proportion of records
that are correctly re-identified in a dataset by an adversary, based on the idea that he wishes
to re-identify as many records as possible in the disclosed database. Lastly, Ferro et al. [13]
propose a methodology for assessing the vulnerability of individuals in a pre-released and
pre-anonymized dataset who may be re-identified by using public data.
The main difference with our paper is that all these works do not provide any systematic
way to perform a complete privacy assessment for the data. They do not give to the data
provider the possibility to understand if there is some possible data aggregation or data
generalization that could help the reduction of privacy risks maintaining data useful for
the development of some service.
Another work relevant for our purposes is the ARX tool [26, 27], which enables the anal-
ysis of the risk of re-identification and the application of various privacy paradigms, very
similarly to our PRUDEnce. Even the iterative method that authors applied in [27] is quite
similar, with the difference that we want to provide the quantification of the data quality
not after but along with the assessment of the privacy risk, in order to be verified before the
application of the chosen mitigation strategies. However, the main difference is that ARX
tool is based on the existence of typical quasi-identifiers, while it cannot be easily applied
to complex high-dimensional identifiers [27], as in the case of mobility data.
In the community of statistical disclosure control some works address the problem of mea-
suring the disclosure risk. Some of them consider the risk of re-identification based on a
perfect matching like us. Others instead propose approaches solving the problem of partial
matching: probabilistic record linkage [18, 39] and distance based record linkage [1, 35].
The goal of probabilistic record linkage (opposite to the deterministic record linkage) is
to establish with a certain probability whether pairs of records from different sources ei-
ther correspond to the same individual or different individuals. In particular, in [18], Jaro
describes the EM (ExpectationMaximisation) algorithm for parameter estimation; this al-
gorithm aims to estimate the maximum likelihood of unknown parameters if some data are
missing. Winkler [39] improves the previous algorithm considering additional properties,
such as allowing a generic log-linear model and convex constraints. The distance-based
record linkage consists of computing distances between records in two different sets of
data; the pairs of records at the minimum distance are considered linked pairs. The effec-
tiveness of this record linkage algorithm heavily relies on the effectiveness of the distance
function. In case of probabilistic and distance-based record linkage, some works use ma-
chine learning algorithms for identifying the worst-case scenario corresponding to the case
with the largest number of re-identifications. Typically, machine learning helps to find for
example the best set of parameters so that the number of re-identifications is maximum
[35]. The inclusion of the partial matching in the PRUDEnce framework might make our
method more general. Thus, it would be interesting to extend our framework including
also these approaches.
The same community also proposes some methods for reasoning on the balancing be-
tween privacy risk and data utility by using Risk-Utility maps [11, 10], that provide the
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Figure 18: The comparison between theoretical lower bound and the actual runtime using
a distributed version w.r.t. the number of nodes used.
trend of the risk-utility curve changing for example the protection strategy. Unfortunately,
these approaches do not enable the reasoning by changing different background knowl-
edge, attacks and dataviews. Therefore, these maps enable only a partial vision with re-
spect our Data Catalog (Section 3.4).
Other kind of works related to ours are those introducing techniques for privacy-preserving
publishing and analysis especially in the context of spatio-temporal data. In [15] authors
discuss the problem of privacy issues in mobility data and provide an overview of tech-
niques for trajectory data publishing. There have been recent work that use generaliza-
tion/suppression techniques. The mostly widely used privacy model of these work is
adapted from what so called k-anonymity[29], which requires that an individual should
not be identifiable from a group of size smaller than k based on their quasi-identifiers. [2]
proposes the (k, δ)-anonymity model that exploits the inherent uncertainty of the mov-
ing object’s whereabouts, where δ represents possible location imprecision. [34] assumes
that different adversaries own different, disjoint parts of the trajectories. Authors use sup-
pression of the dangerous observations from each trajectory. [42] considers timestamps as
the quasi-identifiers, and define a method based on k-anonymity to defend against an attack
called attack graphs. [23] proposes a spatial generalization approach to achieve k-anonymity.
Other works instead use the well-know differential privacy model [12]. [24] considered
a distributed aggregation framework for movement data and proposed the application of
-differential privacy model to guarantee individual privacy. Chen et al. [7] propose to
release a prefix tree of trajectories with injected Laplace noise. However, these approaches
use the standard definition of differential privacy that is based on the global sensitivity
computation which does not consider the actual data to be protected, leading to the risk of
damage data without any need. Recently, some promising variants of the original differ-
ential privacy have been proposed like individual differential privacy [32] and the smooth
sensitivity based approach [25].
8 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed PRUDEnce, a system for assessing privacy risk and quality
of large scale data sets. PRUDEnce helps realizing a privacy-aware ecosystem to share
personal data to and from different organizations of the industry and academia by allowing
quantitative measuring of the risk of re-identification and data quality. The system aims
at assisting companies in avoiding negative impacts, by enabling the sharing of privacy
protected data with a reduced risk. As a consequence, these companies will be able to use
personal data to create new products and services and improve the customer experience,
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share data between different departments or business units to generate additional insights,
efficiencies and opportunities.
We validated our proposal in the context of mobility data, specifically on three different
examples of data formats, i.e., presence data, trajectory data, and road segments, that are
typically used for several specific use cases of mobility services. In particular, we showed
how this kind of data can be analyzed by PRUDEnce to give meaningful measures of the
users’ risk and the data quality varying the privacy guarantee.
As future work we will extend the framework including the measurement of the quality
of a service developed on top of the released data for a deeper analysis of the impact of
a possible data anonymization over the final service quality. Moreover, it would be inter-
esting to integrate in PRUDEnce re-identification techniques which are not based only on
perfect matching like probabilistic and distance based record linkage approaches [35].
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